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Abstract 
Richer and more educated citizens demand better governance than poorer citizens. They 
participate more in the political process, are more difficult to buy off, and tend to have 
the financial resources to support a revolt. An autocrat who is politically insecure may 
therefore not invest in income-enhancing goods like education, roads, the rule of law, etc. 
This argument is not new. The novelty of this paper is to argue that ethnic diversity and 
discrimination exacerbate an autocrat’s fear of the negative effect of high income or 
income-enhancing investments like public education on his political survival. The 
combination of ethnic diversity and the fear of survival results in low economic 
performance in ethnically-diverse autocracies. I show that under such circumstances, the 
proportion of national income that the autocrat appropriates to himself is increasing in the 
degree of ethnic diversity. An implication is that in such ethnically-diverse societies, 
kleptocrats may be better off with a bigger share of a smaller national income than they 
are with a smaller share of a bigger national income. Previous empirical work provides 
some support for my theory. I discuss applications and limitations of my results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Why do some autocracies perform better than others? Why have most autocracies in 
Africa and Latin America governed very badly while the autocracy in China, for 
example, has governed well. Why did the dictators in the former Soviet Union, Eastern 
Europe, and East Asia invest heavily in a growth-enhancing area like education? How is 
it that Seretse Khama governed very well in a de facto one-party state like Botswana? 
What produces an Idi Amin in Uganda or a Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire? Is it a co-
incidence that these Amin and Mobutu were leaders in two of the top three ethnically 
fractionalized countries of the world?1  
In this paper, I argue that ethnic diversity and discrimination combined with the 
negative effect of economic growth on the survival of autocracies account for the poorer 
economic performance of autocrats in more ethnically-diverse societies. 
The negative effect of ethnic diversity on socio-economic performance has been  
theoretically and empirically examined in Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina, Baqir, 
and Easterly (1997), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Collier (2001), Gugerty and Miguel 
(2005), Montalvo and Reynol-Querol (2005), Robinson and Torvik (2005), Padro I 
Miquel (2007), and Putnam (2007). Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) present a survey of 
this literature. 
 There is evidence that to ensure their political survival, autocrats may not  
promote growth even if they can benefit from the higher tax revenue due to growth. 2 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) refer to this fear of political survival as the political 
replacement effect. This effect is at the core of Acemoglu and Robinsion (2000, 2006). 
                                                 
1 See Table III in Easterly and Levine (1997). 
2See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) who apply this idea to the different paths to industrialization taken by 
Britain, Germany, Japan, and Russia. See also Robinson (2001) and the several references cited therein. 
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For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p. 116) argue that “… in Russia, the Tzar 
and political elites were initially strongly opposed to industrialization, or even to the 
introduction of railways. When industrialization in Russia finally got underway after the 
Crimean War, the fears of the elites were confirmed: industrialization brought social 
turbulence in urban centers, and political and social change, culminating in the 1905 
Revolution … Even though the political elites in Russia may have preferred 
industrialization if they could be sure of maintaining power and taxing the proceeds, in 
practice they did oppose it because they were afraid of losing political power.” 3 
 Similarly, Evans (1995, p. 248) notes that “[T]he disorganization of civil society 
is the sine qua non of political survival for predatory rulers. Generating an entrepreneurial 
class with an interest in industrial transformation would be almost as dangerous as 
promoting the political organization of civil society. For predatory states "low level 
equilibrium traps" are not something to be escaped; they are something to be cherished.” 
Wintrobe (1998, p. 23) also argues that the “… modern African dictator … suffers 
from insecurity. For many regimes, this insecurity is unsurprising, given the frequency of 
coups in the notoriously short life of African regimes. However, even a long-lasting 
regime like of Zaire’s Mobutu, which survived for 31 years, was dominated by 
insecurity.” To the extent that military coups and revolutions require resources and 
financial support, an insecure leader will rather impoverish his subjects than make them 
rich. Indeed, as Robinson (2001, p. 28) notes Mobutu “… saw infrastructure as increasing 
                                                 
3 As another example, a growth-enhancing investment like public education could threaten the survival of 
an autocrat. Lipset (1959, p. 79-80) argues that “[E]ducation presumably broadens men’s outlooks, enables 
them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic 
doctrines … If we cannot say that a “high” level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the 
available evidence does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition.” This view is referred to 
as the modernization hypothesis and has received empirical support in Barro (1999) and Glaeser, Ponzetto, 
and Shleifer (2007). 
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the ability of citizens to organize in collective action against him.”4 This view is also 
echoed by Callaghy (1984). 
Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) argue that it is easier for a kleptocrat to 
buy off less productive and poorer groups in order to maintain power. This is yet another 
reason why an autocrat may not promote growth or undertake investments that will boost 
average productivity in the economy. 
 Arguably, an autocrat can maintain his power by improving the economic welfare 
of his citizens. But it depends on whether he is an honest autocrat or a corrupt autocrat 
(i.e., a kleptocrat). If he is a kleptocrat, then the citizens might believe that they can do 
better by getting rid of him. Also, even an honest autocrat might improve the welfare of 
his citizens on a pecuniary dimension but not on non-pecuniary dimensions like freedom 
of speech, freedom of association, etc. Hence, the citizens may use the higher material 
resources stemming from a higher per capita income to agitate for civil rights and 
democratization. 
 The novelty of this paper is to argue that ethnic diversity and discrimination 
exacerbate an autocrat’s fear of the negative effect of high income or income-enhancing 
investments like public education on his political survival. The combination of these two 
factors results in low economic performance in ethnically-diverse autocracies. An 
implication of my analysis is that in more ethnically-diverse societies, kleptocrats may be 
better off with a bigger share of a smaller national income than they are with a smaller 
share of a bigger national income. 
                                                 
4Mobutu is reported to have said to President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda after a coup attempt in 
Rwanda that “I told you not to build any roads... Building roads never did any good ... I've been in power in 
Zaire for thirty years and I never built a road. Now they are driving down them to get you.” (quoted in 
Jeune Afrique, 1991). On Mobutu’s kleptocratic behavior, see Ayittey (1992). 
 
 4
 Padro I Miquel’s (2007) is the closest in spirit to my paper. He argues that 
autocrats in ethnically-diverse societies are able to hold onto power despite large 
reductions in the welfare of their citizens because the members of the autocrat’s ethnic 
group believe that they are better off under his rule than they will be under the rule of 
another leader from a different ethnic group: as the saying goes “the devil you know is 
better than the angel you don’t know.” Hence the autocrat’s ethnic group supports him 
for fear of being ruled by a worse leader from a different ethnic group. This is clearly a 
plausible argument. 
 A crucial assumption in Padro I Miquel (2007) is that a “… ruler needs the 
support of his ethnic group in an ethnically divided society.” A difference between my 
argument and Padro I Miquel’s (2007) argument is that my argument is driven by the 
autocrat’s own sense of insecurity or fear while his argument is driven by the autocrat’s 
ethnic group’s insecurity or fear. To be precise, I focus on the autocrat’s fear of ethnic 
discrimination when he is no longer in power while Padro-I-Miquel (2007) focuses on the 
selectorate’s5 fear of ethnic discrimination when the autocrat is no longer in power. My 
argument is more applicable to autocrats like Mobutu who came from a very small ethnic 
group (Acemoglu et al, 2004) because a small ethnic group could not have kept him in 
power for such a long time (i.e., more than thirty years).6 In contrast, Padro I Miquel’s 
(2007) argument is more applicable to kleptocrats from sufficiently large ethnic groups, 
although this need not be the case. I elaborate on this point in section 3. 
                                                 
5 The selectorate is a term due to de Mesquita et al. (2003). It refers to the group that a ruler depends on to 
hold on to power. In a democracy, the selectorate is the electorate. In an autocracy, the selectorate could be 
the military, party cadres, a group of allies, or the autocrat’s ethnic group. 
6 Autocrats from small ethnic groups could have a high chance of political survival because small ethnic 
group are able to solve the free-rider problem. Like Padro-I-Miquel (2007), I do not examine the collective-
action problem.  
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On the preceding point, Padro I Miquel (2007, p. 1264) observes that “[I]t is 
important to note that the excluded group in this model always tries to unseat the 
incumbent. This is a simplifying assumption because the focus of the analysis is in 
explaining why the ethnic base supports an autocratic ruler. However, it does not capture 
cases in which the leader is forced to subsidize the opposition group because support 
from his own group is not enough.” To reduce the cost of subsidizing members of 
opposing ethnic groups, autocrats from such small ethnic groups may under-develop their 
areas because that it is cheaper to buy off poorer opposing groups. My point is that this 
under-development incentive is stronger in more ethnically-diverse societies. 
To be sure, the degree of ethnic diversity cannot explain the behavior of all 
autocracies. I do not wish to claim that ethnic diversity is the be-all and end-all of all 
autocratic behavior. As Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) argue, history is replete with 
successful and unsuccessful autocracies.7 Using theoretical and empirical insights, Besley 
and Kudamatsu (2007) argue that autocrats govern well when the power of the 
selectorate is independent of the autocrat remaining in office. Besley and Kudamatsu 
(2007) note that their model incorporates Padro I Miquel’s (2007) insight although they 
do not link the identity of the selectorate to ethnicity.  
In more ethnically-diverse societies, it is more likely that in the event of an 
unstable transition of power,8 a new selectorate is likely to emerge from a different 
coalition of ethnic groups, if the deposed autocrat is from a small ethnic group. 
Analogous to the measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization employed in Easterly and 
Levine (1997), one can think of a measure of the ethnic fractionalization of selectorates 
                                                 
7 See also Jones and Olken (2005). 
8 As Padro-I-Miquel (2007) notes such unstable transitions of power is a key feature of societies with weak 
institutions. 
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as the probability that two selectorates under different autocrats are composed of different 
ethnic groups. An argument of this paper is that this probability will be higher in more 
ethnically-diverse societies. 
In their empirical analysis, Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) found that ethnic 
fractionalization had no effect on the success of autocracies if success is measured by 
economic growth or level of education. However, they found that ethnic fractionalization 
had a negative effect on the quality of health care in autocracies. Their analysis lends 
partial credence to the theory in this paper. It must be pointed out, though, that their result 
with respect to economic growth does not confirm nor refute the theory in this paper 
because my formal model examines the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the level of 
income not economic growth. 
Bluedorn (2001) presents empirical evidence of the positive role of democracy in 
mitigating the negative growth effects of ethnic diversity. Collier (2000, 2001) found that 
ethnic fractionalization is detrimental for economic performance in dictatorships but not 
in democracies.9 He considers a dictator who draws his power base from his own ethnic 
group by recruiting the army only from this group. Then the smaller is the ethnic group of 
the dictator, the stronger is the incentive to choose redistribution to his ethnic group at the 
expense of the growth of the entire economy. This is a plausible argument but is different 
from the argument in this paper. However, it lends credence to my theory. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model to 
demonstrate the effect on ethnicity diversity and discrimination on per capita income. 
                                                 
9It must be borne in mind, though, that there are de jure democracies which are de facto autocracies in the 
sense that they replicate the economic outcomes and income distributions of autocracies. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008) refer to such democracies as captured democracies. 
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Section 3 discusses the results, extensions, and limitations of the analysis. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. A model of ethnic diversity and political insecurity 
Consider an infinitely-lived economy with Lt citizens who are governed by a risk-
neutral autocrat in period t. Population grows at the rate η ≥ 0. The autocrat has a 
discount factor, β ∈(0, 1). Each citizen  inelastically supplies a unit of labor in each 
period t.10 The economy’s aggregate output in period t is Yt = F(Gt, Lt), where Gt is 
aggregate public capital provided by the autocrat in period t. This could be roads, 
investment in public education, law and order, protection of private property, health care, 
etc. The public capital, Gt, fully depreciates in each period (see, for example, Robinson, 
2001; Shen, 2007). I relax this assumption in section 2.2. 
Assuming that F(Gt, Lt) is a standard neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale 
production function, we can write per capita output as yt = f(gt, 1), where yt = Yt/Lt and  
gt = Gt/Lt, f(0) = 0, )(f ⋅′ > 0, ,)0(f +∞=′ 0)(f =∞′ and )(f ⋅′′ < 0. Let g > 0 be the 
minimum public capital per person required to maintain law and order and subsistence 
welfare.  
 I represent the political actions of the citizens by the reduced-form function,  
Pt = Pt[yt-1(gt-1)] which is the probability that that the autocrat maintains power in period 
t. I abuse notation by rewriting this as Pt = Pt(gt-1), where )(tP ⋅′ < 0, 
−∞=′ )0(Pt , 0)(Pt =∞′ , )(Pt ⋅′′ > 0, and 0 < Pt < 1. The reasons for )(tP ⋅′ < 0 were given in 
the previous section.  
                                                 
10 I shall later argue that the results do not hinge on the assumption of inelastic labor supply. 
 8
One may argue that since capital depreciates fully after one period, it cannot be 
used as the basis of political revolt. There are three reactions to this argument. First, one 
could assume that in each period the attempt to overthrow the autocrat occurs before 
capital is fully depreciated. Second, output need not be fully depreciated even if the 
capital used to produce it is fully depreciated. The citizens may use part of their output to 
attempt an overthrow of the autocrat. This part of their output will be increasing in the 
capital stock. Finally, I also consider the case where capital does depreciate fully. 
 Let there be n equally-sized ethnic groups in this society. Let the autocrat’s 
payoff, if he loses power, and the new leader is from his ethnic group be θ and let his 
payoff be σ, if the new leader is not from the autocrat’s ethnic group. Due to ethnic 
discrimination, suppose that θ > σ, so that the autocrat gets a higher payoff if the new 
leader is from his ethnic group. For example, he may face a lighter jail sentence if the 
new leader is from his ethnic group. Without loss of generality, suppose that the new 
leader is equally likely to come from one of the n ethnic groups.11 We may write the 
leader’s expected payoff if he loses power as Ω(n) = θ/n + [(n − 1)/n]σ. Clearly,  
∂Ω/∂n = (σ − θ)/n2 < 0. Hence the higher the number of ethnic groups, the lower is the  
autocrat’s expected payoff if he loses power.12 
 If σ = θ, ethnic diversity or the number of ethnic groups will be irrelevant. If a 
person’s payoff is independent of his ethnicity or identity, then such characteristics will 
be irrelevant in socio-economic interactions. Hence it is not ethnic diversity or the 
number of ethnic groups per se that matters. What really matters is the fact that ethnicity 
                                                 
11 The fact that the autocrat cannot guarantee that his successor will come from his ethnic group is 
consistent with the evidence cited in Padro-I-Miquel (2007). 
12 Note that the number of ethnic groups, n, is positively correlated with the measure of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, ELF, used in Easterly and Levine (1997) and several others papers on ethnic diversity.  I 
return to this point when I discuss the limitations of my results in section 3.  
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is used or is perceived to be used as the basis of unfavorable discrimination against 
people who do not belong to one’s ethnic group. Given ethnic discrimination  
(i.e., θ > σ), the number of ethnic groups has a negative effect on the autocrat’s expected  
payoff.13 
Let τt be the unit tax rate in period t on output produced in period t-1. Then the tax 
revenue in period t is τtYt-1. Assume that the autocrat can only set a maximum tax rate of 
τ ∈  (0,1). In McGuire and Olson (1996),14 such a maximum tax rate below unity exists 
because the autocrat is concerned with the deadweight loss of taxation, and in Shen 
(2007), a tax rate above the maximum will lead to a social revolution.  Both effects exist 
in Padro-I-Miquel (2007).15 
I assume that the autocrat is a kleptocrat (Olson, 1993; McGuire and Olson, 1996;  
Mesquita et al., 2003, Padro-I-Miquel, 2007).16 From any given tax revenue, he 
appropriates an amount for his own private use. The autocrat’s problem is to maximize 
the difference between tax revenue and expenditure on public capital.  
The timing of actions is as follows:  
1. At the beginning of period t, there is an attempt to overthrow the autocrat which fails 
with probability, Pt(gt-1) and succeeds with probability 1 − Pt(gt-1). 
                                                 
13In Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Padro-I-Miquel (2007), Ω = 0. More importantly, Ω is 
independent of n. 
14 My model is similar to McGuire and Olson (1996) with the following additions: (1) the autocrat’s 
political survival is a function of the citizen’s per capita income, (2) there is ethnic diversity and ethnic 
discrimination. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) and Robinson (2001) consider the first effect but not 
the second. The novelty of this paper is to demonstrate how the combination of these two effects impinge 
on economic performance. 
15 In his model, the autocrat’s ethnic group will revolt if taxes are excessive. This effect does not apply to 
the ethnic group that does not support the autocrat because they will like to get rid of him regardless of the 
tax rate. However, the autocrat does not overtax them because they will switch to a less productive activity.  
16 De Mesquita et al. (2003, chapter 4) provide a theory of when an autocrat will be a kleptocrat or the 
constraints on the extent of kleptocracy. 
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2. Conditional on being in power in period t, the autocrat taxes the output in the previous 
period yielding a revenue equal to τtLt-1f(gt-1) and invests Ltgt in public capital. This 
yields a payoff of τtLt-1f(gt-1) − Ltgt. If he loses power, he gets Ω(n).  
According to the above timing of events, in period 1 the autocrat imposes a tax on 
the output L0f(g0) produced in period 0 if he is in power. The autocrat makes no decisions 
in period 0. Hence, the autocrat’s planning horizon begins from t = 1.17  
 
2.1 Solving the model 
Since labor is supplied inelastically (i.e., no distortion in taxation), the autocrat 
will set τt = τ  in each period. Given that the public capital fully depreciates after one 
period, the autocrat does not have to consider the marginal benefit of an additional unit of 
capital beyond one period. Hence the autocrat faces a simple static optimization problem  
in each period.18 It is important to note that the benefits of the autocrat’s investment  
accrue one period later while the cost of the investment is immediate.19 When the 
autocrat invests Ltgt in period t, the discounted expected benefit is  
                                                 
17Of course, the periods can be relabeled so that period 1 is period 0 and period 0 is period − 1. 
18While I could have used a finite or single period model to demonstrate some of my results, the infinite 
period model eases exposition. For example, the infinite period model provides a justification for why the 
autocrat may not set a tax rate higher than the maximum for fear of a revolution. In any finite period model, 
there is no reason why an autocrat should fear a revolution in the last period. If so, then if the last period is 
T, the citizens will not produce any output in period T-1 since the autocrat will tax all output in the last 
period. Then the autocrat will not provide any capital in period T-1. Working backwards, there will be no 
production in this economy. There may be ways of getting around this problem in a finite period model. 
However, an infinite period model seems to be a more straightforward and easy way of dealing with this 
commitment problem. Besides, I later consider the case of partial depreciation of capital which makes the 
infinite-horizon even more relevant. 
19 In period t, the choice of gt is equivalent to choosing consumption in period t. Hence, one could treat gt as 
the control variable and gt-1 as the state variable [see Sargent (1987, p. 24) for a similar interpretation].   
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β{Pt+1(gt) )tg(ftLτ + (1 − Pt+1(gt))Ω(n)} in period t+1. The autocrat must equate today’s 
marginal cost to tomorrow’s discounted expected marginal benefit. Conditional on being 
in power, the autocrat chooses gt in period t to maximize  
Wt = β{Pt+1(gt) )tg(ftLτ + (1 − Pt+1(gt))Ω(n)} − Ltgt,     (1) 
subject to given g0 > 0 and L0 > 0 and the feasibility constraint Rt ≡ τ Lt-1f(gt-1) ≥ Ltgt. 
Assume Wt is strictly concave and twice differentiable.20 
It is important to note that in period t, the autocrat’s expected payoff in (1) does 
not include the tax revenue, Rt ≡ τ Lt-1f(gt-1), although this is what he actually gets in 
period t if he maintains power. This is because from the autocrat’s standpoint, the benefit 
of the investment in period t is the expected discounted tax revenue in period t+1. The 
formulation in (1) is required in order to get a meaningful optimization problem because 
the investment in period t has no effect on the tax revenue, Rt ≡ τ Lt-1f(gt-1), in period t. 
Notice also that the investment in period t has no effect on the autocrat’s survival 
probability in period t (i.e., Pt = Pt(gt-1)). 
In period t, the public capital that maximizes the autocrat’s payoff must satisfy 
( ) 0L)}(fL)(P)n()(fL)(P{ tt1tt1t =−⋅′τ⋅+Ω−⋅τ⋅′β ++      (2) 
We can rewrite (2) as21  
( ) 01)}(f)(P)n(ˆ)(f)(P{ 1tt1t =−⋅′τ⋅+Ω−⋅τ⋅′β ++      (2a) 
where .tL/)n()n(tˆ Ω≡Ω  
                                                 
20 For example, this holds if f(g) = gα, P(g) = k/gγ, where 0 < γ < α < 1 and k > 0. 
21 Notice that I could have set up a Lagrangian function, St, where St = Wt + µ[Rt − Ltgt] and µ is the 
Lagrange multiplier. If the feasibility constraint binds (i.e., µ > 0), then )1/()g(fg 1t*t η+τ= − independent of 
Ω. This is not an interesting solution for the problem at hand. Hence, in this section and the next sub-
section, I assume that the feasibility constraint does not bind. 
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If there is no population growth (i.e., η = 0), then )n(1tˆ +Ω = )n(tΩˆ  for all t = 1, 
2, …, ∞. Then equation (2a) implies that *tg  = g* = g*(Ω(n)) for all t = 1, 2, …, ∞.
22  
Putting g* = g*(Ω(n)) into (2a), setting Lt = 1,  and differentiating with respect to 
Ω gives 
D
)(P*g ⋅′=Ω∂
∂  > 0         (3) 
because )(tP ⋅′ < 0 and 
( ) )(fL)(P)(fL)(P2)n()(fL)(PD t1tt1tt1t ⋅′′τ⋅+⋅′τ⋅′+Ω−⋅τ⋅′′≡ +++ < 0    (4) 
due to the strict concavity of Wt.       
It follows that 
n
*g
n
*g
∂
Ω∂
Ω∂
∂=∂
∂ < 0         (5) 
 For a given gt, it is important to note that we can rewrite the autocrat’s expected 
marginal benefit as Pt+1(gt)[ )tg(ftLτ − Ω(n)] +  Ω(n). Therefore, a higher n increases 
)tg(ftLτ − Ω(n) and therefore increases the autocrat’s valuation of being in power. 
Conversely, the cost of not being in power is higher, the higher is n. It is in this sense that 
ethnic diversity and discrimination exacerbate an autocrat’s fear of the negative effect of 
high income or income-enhancing investments like public education on his political 
survival.23 Ceteris paribus, this higher cost of not being in power induces the autocrat to 
reduce the capital stock.  This is the intuition behind the result in (5). 
                                                 
22 The efficient output g** must satisfy 1*)*g(f =′ . It is straightforward to show that g** > g*. 
23 The autocrat’s greater fear does not mean that ethnic diversity shifts or changes the Pt function. The 
greater fear stems from the fact that for the same Pt, ethnicity diversity increases the cost of not being in 
power. 
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Noting that y* = f(g*) is an increasing function, the derivative in (5) implies that 
higher ethnic diversity leads to lower per capita income in an autocracy. This gives the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1: If a higher per capita income has a negative effect on an autocrat’s 
political survival and if his payoff when is out of power is lower when the new leader 
does not belong to his ethnic group than when the new leader belongs to his ethnic 
group, then the autocrat will undertake less income-enhancing investments if the country 
is more ethnically diverse. 
 If there is population growth, then )n(1tˆ +Ω < )n(tΩˆ . Equation (4) then implies 
that *tg
*
1tg <+ . Public capital per person falls over time till it reaches g > 0. 24 So with 
population growth, the autocrat provides very little public capital per person over time. 
However, for *tg > g , the derivative in (5) still holds. That is, for any public capital per 
person that is greater than g , an autocrat in a more ethnically-diverse society provides a 
smaller capital than an autocrat in a less ethnically-diverse society. If the autocrat is in 
power and provides g , he gets ( ) 0g)1()g(fL 1t >η+−τ− in period t. 
What proportion of national income does the autocrat appropriate to himself and 
how does this vary with the level of ethnic fractionalization? Without loss of generality, 
suppose there is no population growth. In each period, we can write the proportion of 
national income that goes to the autocrat as 
))n(*g(f
)n(*g))n(*g(f))n(*g(t
−τ=α        (6) 
 
                                                 
24Note, however, that this result is independent of the degree of ethnic fractionalization. 
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Then 
0
*g/*)g(f
*)g(f1
n
*g
n
*g
*gn
*
t
*
t >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ′−∂
∂−=∂
∂
∂
α∂=∂
α∂ ,     (7) 
given that ∂g*/∂n < 0, f(g) is strictly concave, and f(0) = 0. This gives the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2: If a higher per capita income has a negative effect on an autocrat’s 
political survival and if his payoff when is out of power is lower when the new leader 
does not belong to his ethnic group than when the new leader belongs to his ethnic 
group, then the autocrat will appropriate a higher proportion of national income to 
himself if the country is more ethnically diverse. 
 
2.2 Public capital does not depreciate fully 
Suppose that public capital does not depreciate fully in each period. In particular, 
suppose gt = It + (1 − δ)gt-1, where It is per capita investment in period t and δ ∈(0, 1) is 
the rate of depreciation. I assume that there is no population growth and normalize the 
size of the population to 1.  
The autocrat solves the program: 
∞=1t}tI{
max ∑∞
=
− Ωβ
1t
tt
1t ),I,g(H         (8) 
subject to gt = It + (1 − δ)gt-1 and g0 > 0,  where  
H(gt, It, Ω) = β{Pt+1(gt) )tg(fτ + (1 − Pt+1(gt))Ω(n)} − It     (9) 
is the autocrat’s expected single-period payoff in period t. As before, I assume that  
H(gt, It, Ω) is strictly concave and twice differentiable.  
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Let V(gt, Ω) be the value function in period t. Then the Bellman equation is  
V(gt, Ω) = 
tI
max {H(gt, It, Ω) + βV(gt+1, Ω)}      (10) 
Putting gt+1 = It+1 + (1 − δ)gt into (10) gives 
V(gt, Ω) = 
tI
max {H(gt, It, Ω) + βV(It+1 + (1 − δ)gt, Ω)}     (11)  
 Since H is concave and differentiable, it follows that the value function V is 
concave and differentiable [see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989, p. 83-86)]. Indeed, 
given that H is strictly concave, this result also implies that the maximand on the right-
hand-side of (11) is strictly concave and thus has a unique and differentiable interior 
solution.25 
 Given the observation in the preceding paragraph and noting that 
 gt+1 = It+1 + (1 − δ)[ It + (1 − δ)gt-1],26 the first-order condition for It is: 
( ) 1)}(f)(P)n()(f)(P{ 1t1t −⋅′τ⋅+Ω−⋅τ⋅′β ++ + β(1 − δ)Vg(gt+1, Ω) = 0,     (12) 
where Vg(gt+1, Ω), the derivative of the value function, is the shadow value of capital.  
Given the strict concavity of the objective function, we can write the optimal solution to  
(12) as ),g(II 1t
*
t
*
t Ω= − .27 
Putting ),g(II 1t
*
t
*
t Ω= − into (12) and differentiating with respect to Ω gives 
gg
g*t
H
/V)1()(PI Ω∂∂δ−−⋅′=Ω∂
∂         (13) 
                                                 
25Notice also that the set {(gt+1, gt): gt+1 = It + δgt} is convex and compact. Indeed, the problem in (8) is 
well-behaved [see also Ljungvist and Sargent (2004, p. 87)] 
26 A unit of investment in period t contributes a unit of capital to the capital stock in period t but contributes  
(1 − δ) units to the capital stock in period t+1. 
27 Note that since It affects the level of the capital stock in period t and beyond but does not affect gt-1, the 
optimal investment in period t can only be a function of gt-1 but not gj, j = t, t+1, etc. 
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where ( ) 0)(f)(P)(f)(P2)n()(f)(PH 1t1t1tgg <⋅′′τ⋅+⋅′τ⋅′+Ω−⋅τ⋅′′≡ +++  due to the strict  
concavity of H.28  
 Note that if capital depreciates fully after one period (i.e., δ = 1), then the 
investment in period t would have no effect on the value function in period t+1, hence 
Vg(gt+1) = 0. Then ∂Vg(gt+1)/∂Ω = 0 and so, as expected, the derivative in (13) boils down 
to the derivative in (3).  
If ∂Vg/∂Ω ≠ 0, then the sign of the derivative in (13) is indeterminate which 
means that the sign of n/*tI ∂∂  is also indeterminate. However, the derivative is positive 
if its numerator is negative. A sufficient but not necessary condition for this to hold is 
∂Vg/∂Ω > 0 which implies that ∂Vg/∂n < 0. Given this property of the value function, 
n/*tI ∂∂  = )n/)(/*tI( ∂Ω∂Ω∂∂ < 0. Alternatively, if ∂Vg/∂Ω < 0, so that ∂Vg/∂n > 0 and  
∂Vg/∂n > 0 is sufficiently small (i.e., the absolute of ∂Vg/∂Ω is sufficiently small), 29 then 
the autocrat’s investment in public capital is decreasing in the degree of ethnic diversity.  
This gives the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: If the shadow value of public capital to an autocrat is either (a) 
decreasing in the degree of ethnic diversity, or (b) increasing in the degree of ethnic 
diversity but is sufficiently small, and (c) the autocrat’s probability of being in power is 
decreasing in the stock of public capital, and (d) his payoff when he is out of power is 
decreasing in the degree of ethnic diversity, then the autocrat’s investment in public 
capital is decreasing in the degree of ethnic diversity.  
                                                 
28 Since gt-1 is predetermined in period t, we do not have to worry about the effect of Ω on gt-1. Hence, the 
derivative in (13) makes sense (see also Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989, p. 83 and p. 86). 
29Although the problem is well-behaved, finding the value function is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Therefore, I only state the conditions that must be satisfied to obtain the desired result.  
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 The result in this case of partial depreciation of capital is weaker because the 
marginal return from tax revenue due to investment in public capital is higher than in the 
case of full depreciation. This is because partial depreciation gives the autocrat a much 
longer planning horizon. However, under the conditions stated in proposition 3, the 
negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on economic performance will continue to hold. 
 
3. Discussion and extensions 
As noted in section 1, Collier (2000, 2001) and Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) 
provide some support for the theory in this paper. Before I discuss further applications 
and extensions, it is necessary to mention some caveats. 
First, my claim that Collier (2000, 2001) and Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) lend 
some support to my theory needs an important qualification. Collier (2000, 2001) and 
Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) use a well-known measure of ethnic fractionalization, 
ELF, employed by Easterly and Levine (1997) and several other authors. ELF measures 
the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to 
different ethno-linguistic groups and is higher the more equal is the size of the groups. 
For n equally sized groups, ELF = 1 − ∑j(sj)2 = 1 − 1/n, where sj is the proportion of the j-
th ethnic group in the society. Clearly, ELF is increasing in n.  
However, consider the following. Consider two counties, 1 and 2, each with three 
ethnic groups, A, B, and C. Suppose that the autocrat in each country comes from group 
A. In country 1 these groups have equal sizes so that, if the autocrat loses power, the 
probability that the new leader will come from a different ethnic group is 2/3. In country 
2, the proportions of the groups are sA, sB and sC, where sB + sC > 2/3. Hence my theory 
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will predict that country 2 will have a lower economic performance than country 1 
because the autocrat in country 2 faces a higher risk of being governed by a leader from a 
different ethnic group if he loses power. Yet according to the ELF measure country 1 is  
more fractionalized.  
This discrepancy arises because the autocrat is interested in the probability that, if 
he loses power, the new leader will come from an ethnic group different from his ethnic 
group while ELF measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a 
country will belong to different ethno-linguistic groups. 30 These are two different things 
except in some cases where they will be positively correlated. For example, when the 
ethnic groups are restricted to having equal sizes, then an increase in the number of 
groups is necessarily a decrease in the size of the autocrat’s ethnic group. More generally, 
let the autocrat belong to the i-th ethnic group. Then the probability that he cares about is 
π = (1 − si). We can rewrite ELF as ELF = 1 − (si)2 − ∑j≠i(sj)2. A fall in si increases π but 
ELF will increase if and only if the fall in (si)2 is greater than the rise in ∑j≠i(sj)2. In what 
follows, I assume that ELF and π are positively correlated. 31 
Second, notice that the proportion of the autocrat’s ethnic group in total 
population is 1/n. Hence, ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of ethnic fractionalization, 
the smaller is the size of the autocrat’s ethnic group. Therefore, the propositions could be 
re-stated in terms of the size of the autocrat’s ethnic group. However, the effect of the 
size of the autocrat’s ethnic group could go either way. For example, smaller ethnic 
                                                 
30This argument is independent of the critique against ELF that ethnic heterogeneity does not necessarily 
imply linguistic heterogeneity. 
31Montalvo and Reynal and Reynal-Querol (2005) discuss the limitations of the ELF measure and instead 
propose a measure of ethnic polarization, RQ, where RQ = 4∑j(sj)2(1 − sj). In general, RQ is positively 
correlated with ELF at high low levels of ELF (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2002). However, RQ will 
also not necessarily be positively correlated with π. 
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groups may be able to solve the free-rider problem better than bigger ethnic groups 
(Olson, 1965). Hence a leader from a smaller ethnic may have a higher political survival 
than a leader from a bigger ethnic group.32  
Third, the effect of the politics of fear studied in Padro I Miquel (2007) could 
make autocrats from smaller ethnic groups stronger. Consider a country with three ethnic 
groups, A, B, and C. Suppose that the autocrat is from ethnic group A which is smaller 
than B and C. Suppose also that B and C are of equal sizes. A member of a given ethnic 
group prefers a leader from his own ethnic group to a leader from a different ethnic 
group. However, suppose that ethnic group B gets along better with ethnic group A than 
with ethnic group C.  So the members of ethnic group B prefer a leader from ethnic group 
A to a leader from group C. Then the effect of the politics of fear in Padro I Miquel’s 
(2007) model could lead to an equilibrium where ethnic groups A and B would support 
the incumbent autocrat from ethnic group A.  Indeed, if members of group C also prefer a 
leader from group A to a leader from group B, then one could imagine a situation where 
the politics of fear would result in all three groups supporting the autocrat from group A. 
This could be due to a very high level of mistrust between groups B and C. Hence in a 
world where political survival is based on one’s ethnic group’s support, an autocrat from 
a small ethnic group could still enjoy significant support. Therefore Padro I Miquel’s 
(2007) argument could also apply to autocrats from small ethnic groups. 
Finally, suppose the autocrat’s probability of survival, P, was a function of the 
resources of his ethnic group and the resources of the other ethnic groups. In particular, 
suppose that when he invests in g units of public capital, his ethnic groups gets λg units  
                                                 
32 Collier (2001, p. 141) notes that “[I]n eleventh-century England and Southern Italy the Norman ethnic 
group seized and maintained power to their own advantage despite constituting only some 2% of the 
population.” 
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and the other ethnic groups get (1 − λ)g units, where 0 < λ < 1.33 Then we may write  
P = P(λg, (1 − λ)g) where P is increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the 
second argument. In particular, suppose P(λg, (1 − λ)g) = (λg)α/[(1 − λ)g]γ = ∆g(α − γ) 
where α, γ ∈(0, 1) and ∆ ≡ λα/(1 − λ)γ. Then P is decreasing in g if α < γ but increasing in 
g if α > γ. The parameters, α and γ may reflect differences in the internal organization, 
productivities, and cohesion of the autocrat’s ethnic group relative to the other ethnic 
groups. If P is increasing in g, then the propositions derived in this paper will not hold.  
Ultimately, the effect of g on P is an empirical issue and partly depends on the autocrat’s 
belief. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue the effect of political competition on the 
behavior of autocrats is non-monotonic; “… with a high degree of entrenchment, 
incumbents are willing to innovate, because they are not afraid of losing political power.” 
However, based on the examples and arguments in Callaghy (1984), Evans (1995), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) and other authors, I shall discuss applications of 
my results by assuming that P is actually decreasing or is perceived by the autocrat to be 
decreasing in g. It is indeed in such situations that my results are relevant. For example, 
the evidence mentioned in section 1 suggests an autocrat like Mobutu of Zaire fits this 
scenario (Callaghy, 1984).  
Table III in Easterly and Levine (1997) shows that Zaire is the second most 
ethnically fractionalized country in the world. According to Acemoglu, Robinson, and 
                                                 
33For example, the public good may be a road and the autocrat might award more road contracts to 
members of his ethnic group. Alternatively, different ethnic groups might benefit differently from public 
capital depending on their occupations (e.g., fishing versus farming) or differences in their ability to take 
advantage of public capital like public education, etc. For example, if an ethnic group has very low-quality 
public and secondary schools in its region, then it cannot make good use of the autocrat’s investment in 
university or tertiary education. 
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Verdier (2004), Mobutu of Zaire came from a very small ethnic group and the social base 
of his regime was very small. Proposition 1 could explain why he governed so badly. 
Furthermore, according to Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004), 15-20% of 
the operating budget of Zaire went directly to Mobutu in the 1970s. Proposition 2 implies 
that the high ethnic diversity of Zaire explains why Mobutu embezzled such a high 
percentage of the national budget.  
Given that the autocrat’s maximizing behavior is such that national income is 
decreasing in ethnic fractionalization while his share of this income is increasing in 
ethnic fractionalization, propositions 1 and 2 imply that the autocrat is better off with a 
bigger share of a smaller national income than he is with a smaller share of a bigger 
national income. Indeed, it is clear from (7) that ∂ *tα /∂g* < 0. This makes sense given 
that the level of per capita income has an effect on the balance of power between the 
autocrat and his enemies. In this sense, the autocrat’s relative political power, Pt/(1 − Pt), 
is decreasing in the level of per capita income. Not surprisingly, a higher relative political 
power also translates into a higher relative economic power, *tα . The desire to hold onto 
power in a world where his subjects are relatively much weaker may explain why an 
autocrat would rather be “first in a village than be second in Rome.”34 This is consistent 
with Evans (1995, p. 248) who argues that “[E]xtracting a larger share from a shrinking 
pie is not the optimal way to maximize revenues, but it may be the only way consistent 
with the survival of predatory states.” Proposition 2 implies that this share is bigger in 
ethnically-diverse societies.  
                                                 
34 This statement is attributed to Julius Caeser by Plutarch in the “Life of Caeser”: 
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html 
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In Ghana, Jerry John Rawlings ruled as an autocrat from 1982-1992 and as a 
democrat from 1993 to 2000. One could argue that a reason why he agreed to 
democratization was a clause in the 1992 Ghanaian constitution which indemnified him 
against all actions taken during his autocratic rule. Such a clause is equivalent to a higher 
value of Ω. Notice that due to the two-term limit in the constitution, Rawlings agreed to 
democratization mindful of the fact that he will not be in power after two terms. Such 
indemnity clauses will weaken the fear of ethnic discrimination on an autocrat’s 
behavior. However, they are effective only if the autocrat believes that the society can 
commit to it because the clause may be a time-inconsistent provision in the constitution.35 
The autocrat’s belief then depends on the degree of trust in the society. Arguably, more 
ethnically-diverse societies find it more difficult to build trust (Putnam, 2007). 
Notice that since the autocrat imposes taxes on output after it has been produced, 
he cannot commit to any tax rate below τ . The citizens will not believe him. Therefore, 
in every period the tax rate will still be τ . So even if we were to assume that the citizens 
did not supply their labor inelastically, the analysis will still go through since in every 
period the labor supply will be Lt( τ ). 
As several authors have argued, one key form of political survival for autocrats is 
to engage in patronage transfers. This is at the core of the selectorate theory of de 
Mesquita et al (2003) and the divide-and-rule theory of Acemoglu et al. (2004). My 
model does not have explicit transfers from the autocrat to a subset of the society but one 
can imagine that the autocrat shares some of his rents with certain influential members of 
the society (e.g., the army). One could imagine that the autocrat gives a fixed amount of 
                                                 
35There is a very negative countervailing effect of such clauses. The autocrat might govern very badly 
precisely because of the indemnity he will enjoy if he is out of power. 
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money, B, to members of the army. This amount is enough to keep the army loyal to the 
autocrat. Then the above analysis is equivalent to one in which the political survival 
probability is Pt = Pt(gt-1, B), where B is a shift parameter that is held fixed. 
The autocrat’s payoff when he is no longer in power may depend on the policies 
implemented while in power. Hence, we may write Ω = Ω(n, gt), where Ω(n, gt) is  
increasing in gt. This formulation will not change my results, so long as  
∂Ω(n, gt)/∂n < 0.36 
Finally, while one might argue that autocrats like Mobutu did not bother to invest 
in public capital because they could rely on foreign aid to bail them out, this does not 
change my key argument because autocrats like Mobutu could still have invested the 
foreign in public capital instead of using it for personal consumption. Since foreign aid is 
typically not given directly to the citizens but instead administered through the leaders of 
the recipient country, foreign aid plays the same role as tax revenue in the model.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The paper provides a plausible mechanism through which ethnic diversity could 
lead to a low per capita income in an autocracy. The novelty of this paper is to argue that 
ethnic diversity exacerbates an autocrat’s fear of the negative effect of high income or 
income-enhancing investments like public education on his political survival. The 
combination of ethnic diversity and the fear of survival results in low economic 
performance in ethnically-diverse autocracies. The behavior of autocrats like Sani 
                                                 
36It is important to note that the autocrat’s belief that his payoff, if he is no longer in power, hinges on the 
ethnicity of the new leader need not be true. All that matters is that there is enough mistrust among ethnic 
groups such that the autocrat believes that his payoff when he is no longer in power hinges on the ethnicity 
of the new leader. 
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Abacha of Nigeria, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, and Idi Amin of Uganda fits this 
explanation. Their own fears and mistrust of their citizens in very highly diverse ethnic 
societies meant that it was in their parochial interest to impoverish their subjects. In such 
ethnically-diverse societies, autocrats may be better off with a bigger share of a smaller 
national income than they are with a smaller share of a bigger national income.  
 Of course, behavior is influenced by a person’s nature (i.e., preferences) and 
constraints (i.e., nurture). In this paper, I have focused on the external environment or 
constraints. To be sure, the external environment as captured by the society’s cultural 
norms and values may affect a person’s preferences. However, it is much harder to come 
up with testable hypothesis about preferences.37 While an autocrat need not be a 
kleptocrat, I have shown that autocrats with similar preferences (i.e., those who are 
kleptocrats) will behave differently depending on the ethnic diversity of their societies.38 
 
                                                 
37 On this issue, de Mesquita et al. (2003, p. 164) observe that “… we recognize that some leaders are 
personally civic-minded. Such leaders will take the discretionary funds that constitute their opportunity for 
kleptocracy and spend them on projects that enhance general welfare in the society; they are not inclined to 
steal from the state. Our theory does not include an independent assessment of each leader’s degree of 
civic-mindedness, although we do not deny its existence.” 
38 As noted earlier, Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) argue that autocrats govern well when the power of the 
selectorate is independent of the autocrat remaining in office.  
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